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Abstract
This study explores whether an oath to honesty can reduce both shirking and lying among
crowd-sourced internet workers. Using a classic coin-ﬂip experiment, we ﬁrst show that
a substantial majority of Mechanical Turk workers both shirk and lie when reporting
the number of heads ﬂipped. We then demonstrate lying can be reduced by ﬁrst asking
each worker to swear voluntarily on his or her honor to tell the truth in subsequent
economic decisions. The oath, however, did not reduce shirking as measured by time-
at-coin-ﬂip-task, although it did increase the time they spent answering a demographic
survey. Conditional on response, MTurk shirkers and liars were less likely to agree to an
ex post honesty oath. Our results suggest oaths may help elicit more truthful behavior
in on-line crowd-sourced environments.
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1 Introduction
Some workers shirk and they often misrepresent the value of their contribution when monitor-
ing is weak (see Akerlof, 1970; Maskin, 1999). When they can blur the link between payoﬀs
and eﬀort with strategically insincere statements, the shirkers gain at society's expense. On
net, society is earning fewer beneﬁts at greater costs. The basic idea of mechanism design is
to address this ineﬃciency. In theory, a well-designed demand-revealing mechanism attempts
to address this challenge. A typical mechanism uses ﬁnancial incentives to overcome this
strategic behavior and reveal preferences/skill by either providing a menu that links rewards
and eﬀort (see e.g., Laﬀont and Tirole, 1988), or by separating what people say from what
they earn in pay (e.g., Vickrey, 1961).
In practice, however, not all demand revealing mechanisms need to be ﬁnancial. The
solemn oath to honesty is an ancientand time testedmechanism designed to eliminate
strategic misbehavior by asking a person to commit to the truth (see Tyler, 1835; Kiesler
and Sakumura, 1966; Joule and Beauvois, 1998; Joule, Fabien, and Bernard, 2007). Evidence
suggests that in economic contexts people under oath lie less, coordinate better, trust each
other, and cooperate more (Jacquemet et al. 2013, 2017, 2018a, 2018b; Stevens, Tabatabaei,
and Lass, 2013; 2018; Hergueux et al., 2016; Beck et al., 2016).1
The open question we address herein is whether a non-ﬁnancial honesty oath works to
reduce shirking and lying about payoﬀs in an anonymous ﬁnancial task. Using a unique
ﬁeld experiment carried out on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), we explore whether the
1Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004) similarly ﬁnd that making a promise enhances cooperation in a hold-up
game.
2
honesty oath works for reducing both shirking and lying. MTurk workers MTurkers are
independent piece-rate contractors popular nowadays in many economics experiments (see
for example Horton, Rand, and Zeckhauser, 2011; Garbarino, Slonim and Villeval, 2019).
But there remains signiﬁcant concerns about the quality of data that is collected in online
environments where monitoring is diﬃcult (Chandler, Mueller, and Paolacci, 2014; Fleisher,
Mead, and Huange, 2015; Smith et al. 2016). According to Ford (2017), The potential for
encountering speeders and cheaters appear to be signiﬁcant for research using MTurk.2
Using a variant of the classic coin ﬂipping-for-payment experiment (see e.g., Bucciol and
Piovesan, 2011; Abeler et al., 2014)3, we build upon earlier work and utilize an experimental
design that allows for greater privacy and allows us to more precisely estimate intrinsic lying
costs. We recruited MTurkers and asked them to perform a simple task: ﬂip a coin ten
times. They were paid ten cents for each head they reported ﬂipped. Our design oﬀers
three advantages over other coin-ﬂip/die role experiments that took place in a lab or over
the phone (e.g., Abeler et al., 2014; Beck et al., 2016).4 First, we had complete anonymity
and privacy; it was clearly impossible for us to observe whether an MTurker performed the
task or truthfully reported the outcome. Moreover, MTurkers are only identiﬁed by their user
name which we cannot possibly link to their actual identity. In contrast, although participants
were anonymous in Abeler et al., the authors acknowledge that the participants' might not
2It should be pointed out that some existing research shows that subjects on MTurk behave similarly to
those in more traditional laboratory settings and are at least as attentive to instructions as other subjects
(Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis, 2010; Horton, Rand, and Zeckhauser, 2011; Buhrmester, Kwang, and
Gosling, 2011; Goodman, Cryder, and Cheema, 2013; Hauser and Schwarz, 2016).
3Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) similarly examine lying behavior by asking subjects to role dice
rather than ﬂip a coin.
4In the Beck et al. study subjects were required to sign an honesty oath. This is potentially problematic as
oaths are considered to be most eﬀective when freely signed (Jacquemet, Joule, Luchini, and Shogren, 2013).
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perceive this since the researcher already had their land line phone number (see footnote 9
of their paper). By administering the experiment in this environment, we relieve subjects
of additional social pressures that can bias estimated intrinsic lying costs. Second, we asked
subjects to carry out a time-consuming task (ﬂipping a coin ten times). By using a hidden
timer, we can identify subjects that surely did not actually carry out the requested task, i.e.,
we can identify people that clearly shirked. This also allows us to evaluate the behavior of
workers that are known to be acting dishonestly, rather than focusing purely on group-level
eﬀects. Third, MTurk workers also tend to be more representative of the U.S. population
than many other in-person samples (Berinsky, Huber and Lenz, 2012) reducing questions of
external validity.
We are not the ﬁrst to to measure lying behavior online using the common coin-ﬂipping
technique. Similar to our analysis, Garbarino, Slonim, and Villeval (2019) use a mind coin-
tossing game in which subjects on MTurk are paid according to their prediction of what their
toss will be and document clear lying behavior. Suri and Mason (2011) similarly ask MTurkers
to role a die and oﬀer to pay them $0.25 x the outcome of the role. They ﬁnd that too many
ﬁves and sixesand too few ones and twosare rolled in this environment. Our most obvious
and signiﬁcant contribution to this literature is that we evaluate the eﬀectiveness of both
ex-ante and ex-post honesty oaths to induce truthful responses and reveal both dishonest
behavior (shirking) and dishonest answers (lying) in an online labor market.
Four key results emerge from our experimental design regarding shirking and lying. First,
do MTurkers shirk? Yes, we ﬁnd that about 58 percent of MTurkers completed the coin ﬂipping
task in under 30 seconds, which we estimate is the minimum required time to ﬂip a coin ten
4
times. Second, do MTurkers lie? Yes, consistent with other studies, our results show that the
distribution of ﬂips is skewed signiﬁcantly towards more heads than one would expect from
random draws of a binomial distribution. Third, does the oath reduce lying and shirking?
Yes and no. Yes, the oath reduced lying, though it did not eliminate it. No, our results show
that the oath did not reduce shirking (a similar percentage of MTurkers completed the task in
under 30 seconds). Fourth, we ﬁnd that young and male MTurkers were more likely to shirk
and lie without the oath, and cynical MTurkers (those who said they do not trust others, or
believe other people are liars and cheaters) were more likely to lie themselves.
2 Experimental Design
The experiment was administered on Amazon's Mechanical Turk, which is an online platform
that connects employers (or requesters) with potential workers. The tasks (or human intel-
ligence tasks (HITs)) that MTurkers complete are typically simple and straightforward (e.g.,
answering a questionnaire) and can be completed privately and anonymously at any location.
MTurkers were randomly assigned to one of two treatments (Oath and No Oath). To avoid
possible temporal bias, we released a batch of 200 HITs every two hours until the budget was
exhausted. MTurkers could only participate once. The only restriction on participation was
that the MTurkers had to be at least 18 years of age.
The experiment was advertised on Mechanical Turk with the title, Answer a survey con-
sisting of approximately 25 questions and with the description, Carry out a simple coin ﬂip-
ping exercise, then answer a set of survey questions. This page also read, We are conducting
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an academic survey. We need your input to help us understand general human behaviors.
Select the link below to complete the survey. At the end of the survey, you will receive a code
to paste into the box below to receive credit for taking the survey.
After agreeing to the task, MTurkers were redirected to a Qualtrics survey. The ﬁrst page
thanked them for participating, and elicited informed consent to participate in an academic
study. This page also informed them that, You will be paid $1.00 for completing the survey
and will have an opportunity to earn additional money during the survey. At the end of
the survey you will be given a code to enter into Mechanical Turk to receive this payment.
This survey should take no more than 3 minutes to complete. Additional information was
provided, such as a requirement for MTurkers to be at least eighteen years old and that all of
the information obtained would be kept anonymous and conﬁdential.
Upon agreeing to the task, MTurkers in the Oath treatment were shown a screen that read,
Before we begin, do you swear upon your honor to answer the following questions truthfully?
(You will be allowed to continue with this survey regardless of your answer to this question).
MTurkers did not sign the oath, they simply clicked yes or no. While agreeing to the oath
was optional, only three MTurkers did not agree to this oath. The oath was administered prior
to MTurkers knowing anything about the task at hand, or the ﬁnancial penalty associated
with being honest. Regardless of how MTurkers answered the oath question, the next screen
read Flip a coin 10 times. You will be paid a bonus of 10 cents per head that is ﬂipped.
How many heads did you ﬂip?.5 MTurkers were then provided a drop-down menu where they
5While the monetary reward for lying is small, note that $1.00 amounts to roughly thirty minutes of work
for a typical MTurker (the median wage on Mechanical Turk is just $2.00 per hour according to Hara et al.
(2018).
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selected their answer. The No Oath MTurkers were not presented with the oath screen, and
instead went directly to the coin-ﬂipping task. After the coin-ﬂipping task, in both treatments,
MTurkers then completed a survey which contained demographic questions and a subset of
questions from the World Values Survey.6 The survey was identical across the two treatments
except that No Oath MTurkers were given an ex-post oath immediately following the coin-
ﬂipping stage that read, Do you swear upon your honor that the number of heads you reported
ﬂipping is truthful? (You will be paid according to the number of heads you reported ﬂipping
regardless of your answer to this question). MTurkers in the Oath treatment were instead
asked Did swearing upon your honor to tell the truth aﬀect the number of heads you reported
ﬂipping?. MTurkers were required to answer each question to proceed to the next question,
and were not allowed to go back and change previous answers. A hidden timer recorded how
long it took to complete the coin-ﬂipping task and the survey; MTurkers did not know they
were being timed. This feature allows us to identify those MTurkers who could not possibly
have carried out the coin ﬂipping task because it was completed too quickly. Hereafter we
refer to these MTurkers as shirkers as they clearly did not complete the task as requested.
Conversely, for MTurkers that used a suﬃcient amount of time to have possibly completed
the task are refered to as workers.7
A common concern with Mechanical Turk is that workers are not thinking carefully about
the questions being asked, or that automated programs (bots) that are designed to mimic
human behavior contaminate results. We address these concerns in two ways. First, about
6See online appendix.
7Note that we can only identify those MTurkers that certainly did not complete the task, and cannot
identify those that certainly did complete it.
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halfway through the survey, we asked MTurkers, We want to make sure you are not a robot.
What is the number two plus the number three equal to?. Those MTurkers who gave an
incorrect answer to this question were dropped from the analysis.8 Second, since assignment
to treatment was random, inattentive MTurkers (or even non-human MTurkers) were equally
likely to be assigned to a particular treatment, and therefore should not bias the estimated
treatment eﬀect.
3 Results
We collected data from 1,410 MTurkers. Of these, we dropped the 43 (3%) MTurkers who
failed to correctly answer the question about what the sum of 2+3 equals. In addition,
one MTurker who spent 1,700 seconds answering the coin ﬂipping question was dropped to
minimize outlier bias when we examine ﬂipping times. This leaves 1,366 observations (681 in
the Oath treatment and 685 in the No Oath treatment).
Table 1 gives variable names and deﬁnitions. Table 2 gives the summary statistics. Across
the Oath and No Oath treatments, MTurkers were predominantly male (≈60%), white (≈63%)
and physically located in the USA (82%). The average age was 35 (σ=10.7). None of the
MTurkers in the No Oath treatment were Hispanic, whereas 4.7% were Hispanic in the Oath
treatment. Across all other characteristics, MTurkers in the Oath and No Oath treatments
were similar, suggesting that the random assignment of MTurkers to treatment was successful.
8This method of bot detection is commonly used on Mechanical Turk (Crump, McDonnell, and Gureckis,
2013).
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3.1 Do MTurkers Shirk and Lie?
MTurkers are rarely asked to take an oath before completing a task, we therefore begin by
using the No Oath treatment as a baseline to address this question of whether MTurkers
shirk and/or lie. Shirking is the failure to perform the agreed upon task, i.e. not ﬂipping the
coin ten times as instructed. Some, but not all, shirking can be detected at the individual
level based on the amount of time an individual spent ﬂipping the coin. The Qualtrics survey
included a hidden timer that recorded how long an individual spent on the page that described
the coin ﬂipping task and compensation, and asked MTurkers to report the observed number
of heads. To determine the minimum amount of time needed to complete this task, we asked
28 students in a large university class to ﬂip a coin that had been provided to them 10 times
as quickly as possible, count the number of heads, and enter the result online in the same way
MTurkers in the experiment reported their answers. The fastest that any student completed
the coin ﬂipping task was 27 seconds, with a mean of 102 seconds. Based on this, we concluded
that it was impossible to complete the task in less than 30 seconds (note that in the classroom
pilot, students already had a coin available and were prepared to ﬂip before the timer started,
whereas for the MTurkers, ﬂipping time also included time spent getting a coin). We deﬁne
a quick response as one that was completed in less than thirty seconds and we label those
workers as shirkers. A slow response was completed in at least thirty seconds and we refer
to these MTurkers as workers.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of ﬂipping time by treatment (for display purposes, the
ﬁgure omits those MTurkers who took more than 200 seconds). In the No Oath treatment,
42.6% (n=292) of MTurkers completed the task in less than 30 seconds. Because the task was
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done in private, we have no way of knowing whether a slow MTurker actually performed
the task. Therefore, these quick responses represent a lower bound on shirking. The data
clearly indicate that, yes, a nontrivial number MTurkers did not ﬂip the coin as instructed,
and did shirk.
We deﬁne lying as intentionally making a false statement, which in this context means
an MTurker misreported the actual number of heads observed. Because all decisions were
made in private, it is impossible to detect whether any particular individual lied. However,
we can detect lying in the aggregate by comparing the distribution of reported outcomes to
the expected distribution if all reports were truthful.
Privacy and anonymity, combined with the bonus payment of 10 cents per reported head,
created an incentive for MTurkers to report a larger number of heads than they actually
observed since there are no ﬁnancial or social consequences for lying. Pooling across shirkers
and workers, in the No Oath treatment, MTurkers reported an average of 6.33 heads (Table
3) and we reject the null hypothesis that this is less than or equal to the expected mean of ﬁve
(p-value = 0.000) if all reporting were truthful. Panel (d) of Figure 2 compares the reported
outcomes for the No Oath treatment with the truthful distribution, pooled across workers
and shirkers. The modal response (n=298, 21.8%) was six (a small lie), and 18% of MTurkers
(n=122) reported ﬂipping ten heads in a row (a big lie). This result is similar to Fischbacher
and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) who ﬁnd that 20% of subjects lie to the fullest extent possible in
their die-rolling experiment. The binomial probability of observing 10 heads is 0.1%, which
implies that we should expect to observe this outcome no more than once if all MTurkers
reported truthfully. Even if we were to drop all MTurkers who reported ﬂipping ten heads,
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the average number of reported heads ﬂipped is 5.5, which is still statistically diﬀerent from
ﬁve (p-value = 0.000). Similarly, Panel F of Table 3 shows that for slow MTurkers, who had
enough time to complete the task, the mean number of heads is 5.76, with 9.4% reporting 10
heads. We therefore conclude that, yes, on average MTurk workers lie. These lies come in two
primary forms. Some of these lies are plausible (i.e. reporting 6) and others are implausible
big lies that maximize the worker's earnings (reporting 10).
The conclusion that MTurkers lie is robust across both the shirkers (i.e., MTurkers who
completed the task in under 30 seconds) and the workers for whom the time spent on the
ﬂipping task was suﬃcient for them to have possibly done the task (Table 3). Not surprisingly,
in the No Oath treatment the shirkers reported more heads than the slow workers (6.79 vs
5.98, p=0.000). Shirkers are also signiﬁcantly more likely to report observing 10 heads (29.1%
vs 9.4%, p=0.000). Panels b and c of Figure 2 show that while the modal responses for shirkers
were ﬁve and ten, for workers the mode was six. This ﬁnding is consistent with the idea that
slow workers were engaged in a more sophisticated form of deception that was more time
consuming and exerted more cognitive eﬀort.
3.2 Does an oath reduce shirking & lying?
Next we examine whether agreeing to a solemn oath increased the intrinsic cost of lying. Table
3 shows the unconditional results. The average number of heads reported ﬂipped by MTurkers
in the Oath treatment was 6.05, which is signiﬁcantly less than the number reported ﬂipped
by No Oath MTurkers (6.33, p-value = 0.008). That the mean exceeded 5 (p-value = 0.000)
indicates that the oath is not a panacea for truth telling. The oath also worked to reduce the
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number of MTurkers who reported ﬂipping ten heads in a row (p-value = 0.006). Eighty eight
(12.9%) MTurkers in the Oath treatment reported ﬂipping ten heads in a row where as 122
(17.8%) of No Oath MTurkers did so.
The ﬁrst column of Figure 2 gives the distribution of heads ﬂipped for Oath and No Oath
treatments pooled across shirkers and workers. The truthful distribution is provided for
comparison purposes. A one-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov test conﬁrms that the distribution
in the Oath treatment is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than that for the No Oath treatment (at the
10% conﬁdence level). A test of normality (Shapiro-Wilk test) conﬁrms the two distributions
are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the normal distribution. However, dropping MTurkers that
reported ﬂipping ten heads, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the oath had no eﬀect.
This implies that the oath largely worked by decreasing the number of MTurkers that told
big, obvious lieslike reporting to have ﬂipped ten heads in a row and is consistent with the
idea that telling big lies is more costly than telling small lies (Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi,
2008; Suri and Mason, 2011).
Table 3 also shows that the oath had little eﬀect on the time MTurkers spent answering the
coin-ﬂipping question. Further, the oath had no eﬀect on the probability an MTurker shirks
(responds in to the coin-ﬂipping task in less than thirty seconds). However, we do observe
that the oath induced MTurkers to spend approximately 30 additional seconds ﬁlling out the
survey (net of the time spent on the coin-ﬂipping task). See Figure 3 for the distribution of
response times by Oath and No Oath MTurkers. This amounts to roughly a 30/214=14%
increase in survey duration. One speculative interpretation for these contrasting ﬁndings
is that workers view their responses to survey questions as potentially consequential; their
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answers may directly inﬂuence any conclusions drawn from the study. In contrast, the coin-
ﬂipping task may be viewed as a time-consuming random number generator that can be
costlessly avoided by strategically picking a number between zero and ten.9
Shirkersthose MTurkers that spent less than thirty seconds on the coin-ﬂipping task
certainly did not carry out the task as requested whereas workers may have carried it out.
We now examine the eﬀect of the oath separately for these two groups of people. Table 3
shows that the oath was similarly eﬀective at reducing the number of heads reported ﬂipped
by both shirkers and workers. Figure 2 shows the distributions of heads ﬂipped for shirkers
and workers. The oath reduced the probability a shirker reports ten heads, and increased the
probability of reporting ﬁve heads. The oath had a similar eﬀect for workers, but for this
group the distribution is less bi-modal. However, according to Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests,
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the oath had no eﬀect on the distribution of heads
ﬂipped for either shirkers or workers. According to Shapiro-Wilk tests, we also reject the null
hypothesis that each of the distributions in Figure 2 are similar to a normal distribution.
At the end of the survey, we asked Oath MTurkers: Did swearing upon your honor to tell
the truth aﬀect the number of heads you reported ﬂipping. We estimate the probability of
answering yes as a function of age, gender, race, the number of heads ﬂipped, the indicator
for ﬂipping ten heads in a row, and the indicator for shirking. We ﬁnd that both black and
white MTurkers were less likely to say that the oath mattered, whereas we ﬁnd the opposite for
Asian MTurkers.10 This is consistent with the earlier ﬁndings that the eﬀect of the oath was
9A potentially useful variant of this study would be to ask subjects to carry out consequential tasks under
oath.
10These results are available from the authors upon request.
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statistically insigniﬁcant for both White and Black MTurkers. We also ﬁnd that, conditional
on reporting to have ﬂipped ten heads, heads ﬂipped enters positively. This implies that, the
oath may have been most eﬀective for people that told small lies (that may have otherwise
told large lies). Taken together, there is some evidence that subjects were aware of the eﬀect
of the oath.
3.3 Further Analysis
3.4 Heterogeneous Eﬀects
We test for heterogeneous oath eﬀects by regressing the number of heads reported ﬂipped on
the oath, exogenous MTurker characteristics, and the interaction of the two. Table 4 shows
that being young or male both increase the number of heads reported ﬂipped. Interestingly,
while the oath enters negatively, the interaction term White×Oath enters positively. A Wald
test conﬁrms that Oath +White×Oath is not statistically diﬀerent from zero (p-value = 0.78),
implying the oath had no eﬀect on white MTurkers. However, a similar test conﬁrms that the
oath was weakly signiﬁcant for male MTurkers (p-value =0.08). This is result is not surprising
given that we have already shown that males tend to tell bigger lies more often than females.
Similar results are found by examining the probability that an MTurker reported ﬂipping ten
heads in a row. For this outcome, in the second column of Table 4, the oath enters negatively
and is signiﬁcant at the 10.4% conﬁdence level. Wald-tests conﬁrms that the oath was only
eﬀective for male MTurkers (p-value =0.04).
We explore other potential sources of heterogeneity in Table 5. However, these results
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should be viewed with some added caution as the subject characteristics considered here are
potentially endogenous and this makes causal inference more challenging. Each row gives
the results of separate regressions of the number of heads ﬂipped on the oath, the respective
subject characteristic, and the interaction of the two. The Direct eﬀect of each characteristic
is given in column 1 and the interaction of each characteristic and the oath is given in the
second column. For example, believing that it is often justiﬁed to claim public beneﬁts that
one is not legally entitled to is positively associated with the number of heads reported ﬂipped
(coeﬃcient=0.160, p-value = 0.000) and the oath did not uniqely aﬀect this group of people
(coeﬃcient on interaction=-.033, p-value =.502).
For nearly all subject characteristics, we ﬁnd no evidence of heterogeneous eﬀects of the
oath. However, we do ﬁnd that the oath is more eﬀective for people making less than $30,000.
We also ﬁnd some evidence that the oath is less eﬀective for people who report going to church
once a week, but the other measures of religiosity do not interact with the oath in a meaningful
or signiﬁcant way. Turning to the direct eﬀects, we observe that people who think it is often
justiﬁed to cheat, steal, bribe, or fail to pay due taxes are more likely to report a high number
of heads. We similarly ﬁnd that people who trust others are less likely to report a high
number of heads. For example, a person that believes the majority of foodstamp recipients
are acting fraudulently or otherwise cheating the U.S. welfare system report ﬂipping 0.465
more heads. Given the average number of heads reported ﬂipped among Oath MTurkers is
6.05, this amounts to a 7.6% increase in the number of heads reported ﬂipped. These speciﬁc
results reinforce the idea that dishonest people view others as being similarly dishonest.
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3.4.1 Ex-Post Oath
Immediately after answering the coin-ﬂipping question, No Oath MTurkers were asked if they
would swear upon their honor that the number of heads they reported ﬂipped was accurate.
We estimate the relationship between the likelihood of agreeing to this ex-post oath and both
reported heads ﬂipped and response time.
Table 6 shows that MTurkers who reported ﬂipping a large number of heads were less likely
to agree to the ex-post oath. This result is statistically signiﬁcant and robust to conditioning
on observed MTurker heterogeneity. We also ﬁnd that MTurkers who reported ﬂipping ten
heads in a row were less likely to agree to the ex-post oath (columns 3 and 4). Interestingly, the
last column of Table 6 shows that the eﬀect of heads ﬂipped remains negative after conditioning
its eﬀect on the indicator for ﬂipping ten heads as well as the indicator for shirking Quick.
This implies that even MTurkers that lied a little (did not report ﬂipping ten heads) were
less likely to agree to the ex-post oath than people who reported more honest answers. Also,
conditional on heads reported ﬂipped, shirkers (Quick) MTurkers were less likely to agree to
the ex-post oath. This suggests that MTurkers who did not carry out the coin-ﬂipping task
may have viewed their behavior as dishonest, regardless of the answer they gave.
Dropping the 70 MTurkers from the No Oath treatment (N =685) that did not agree to
the ex-post oath, the average MTurker in the No-Oath treatment reported ﬂipping 6.08 heads.
While this number is signiﬁcantly greater than 5 (p=0.000), it is also signiﬁcantly less than
the number of heads reported ﬂipped by MTurkers that did not agree to the ex-post oath
(8.5) in this treatment. Taken together, this result suggests that asking MTurkers to swear
on their honor following the completion of a task may help identify shirkers and liars.
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4 Conclusion
We test whether MTurk workers lie and shirk, and explore whether a solemn oath to be honest
can reduce the prevelence of both. We asked roughly 1,400 MTurkers to ﬂip a coin ten times
and report the number of heads they ﬂipped. MTurkers were paid a bonus of ten cents for each
head reported ﬂipped. In this environment, there is a clear and direct cost associated with
telling the truth. Although we cannot tell whether individual MTurkers told the truth, we can
observe whether groups of people lied on average because we know the underlying truthful
distribution. Using a hidden timer, we are also able to identify shirkersthose MTurkers that
answered the coin-ﬂipping question too quickly to have actually carried out the task.
We ﬁnd that MTurkers both lie and shirk and that the oath reduces lying, but has little
eﬀect on shirking. Whereas no-oath MTurkers reported to have ﬂipped 6.33 heads on average,
MTurkers under oath reported just 6.05 heads (a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence). We also
ﬁnd that the oath increased the time MTurkers spent answering a set of post-coin ﬂipping
survey questions, which is consistent with the idea that agreeing to a solemn oath caused
MTurkers to answer survey questions more carefully. Examining MTurker characteristics,
being young and male signiﬁcantly increases the likelihood of reporting a high number of
heads ﬂipped. Measures of religiosity (such as regularly attending church or believing in God)
had no eﬀect on either the number of heads reported ﬂipped, or the eﬀectiveness of the oath.11
We do however ﬁnd that MTurkers who think other people are liars and cheaters are more
likely to lie themselves. We also ﬁnd that MTurkers who shirked and lied were less likely to
11This result is consistent with existing literature which ﬁnds that religiosity is not signiﬁcantly correlated
with honesty (see for example Huelsman, Piroch, and Wasieleski, 2006).
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agree to an ex-post honesty oath. Taken together, these results suggest that oaths may be
an eﬀective tool to induce honestly, and identify dishonest workers in online, crowd sourced
environments.
It is possible that the failure of the oath to reduce shirking was because workers took an
oath to honesty, rather than an oath to task (i.e., a commitment to actually perform the task
as described). Future research should test whether an oath to task can reduce shirking. In
addition, it is possible that one reason we observe a large amount of shirking on the coin-
ﬂipping task, but a signiﬁcant eﬀect of the oath on the amount of time spent on the survey,
is because workers perceive the survey as meaningful or consequential, whereas reporting the
number of heads ﬂipped is viewed as less so. Future research could explore this conjecture
further.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Tables & Figures
Table 1: Variable Deﬁnitions
Outcome Survey Question # Deﬁnition
Heads Flipped Q3 Number of heads reported ﬂipped. Ranges from 0 to 10
Male Q8 = 1 for male workers
Age Q19 Reported age of worker
White Q28 = 1 for White workers
Black Q28 = 1 for Black workers
Hispanic Q28 = 1 for Hispanic workers
Asian Q28 = 1 for Asian workers
Other Q28 =1 for non White, Black, Hispanic, Asian.
USA Q25 = 1 for workers living in the U.S.A.
Justiﬁed Beneﬁts Q57 Is it ever justiﬁed to claim government beneﬁts you are not entitled to?
Ranges from 0 (never justiﬁed) to 10 (always justiﬁed).
Justiﬁed Transport Q57 Is it ever justiﬁed to avoid paying for public transport?
Ranges from 0 (never justiﬁed) to 10 (always justiﬁed).
Justiﬁed Steal Q57 Is it ever justiﬁed to steal?
Ranges from 0 (never justiﬁed) to 10 (always justiﬁed).
Justiﬁed Taxes Q57 Is it ever justiﬁed to cheat on taxes?
Ranges from 0 (never justiﬁed) to 10 (always justiﬁed).
Justiﬁed Bribe Q57 Is it ever justiﬁed justiﬁed to accept a bribe?
Ranges from 0 (never justiﬁed) to 10 (always justiﬁed).
Trust People Q41 Dummy variable =1 for workers who think Most people can be trusted
and 0 for workers that think you need to be very careful in dealing with people.
SNAP Cheat Q29 =1 if more than 50% of foodstamp recipients are believed to be acting fraudulently, or otherwise
cheating the U.S. welfare system
Heads Guessed Q30 How many heads will the average worker report to have ﬂipped?
Variable ranges from 0 to 10.
God Q51 = 1 for workers that believe in god.
Hell Q52 = 1 for workers that believe in hell.
No Church Q49 = 1 for workers that report going to church Never, practically never.
Low Church Q49 = 1 for workers that report going to church Once a month.
Med Church Q49 = 1 for workers that report going to church Once a week.
High Church Q49 = 1 for workers that report going to church More than once a week.
No Religion Q26 = 1 for workers that Do not belong to a denomination.
Hindu Q26 = 1 for workers that are Hindu.
Muslim Q26 = 1 for workers that are Muslim.
Jew Q26 = 1 for workers that are Jewish.
Catholic Q26 = 1 for workers that are Catholic.
Protestant Q26 = 1 for workers that are Protestant.
High Income Q21 =1 for workers that report a household income greater than $99,000.
Low Income Q21 = 1 for workers that report a household income less than $30,000.
Satisﬁed Financial Q43 Ranges from 1 (not satisﬁed) to 10 (satisﬁed) with the ﬁnancial situation of your household.
Satisﬁed Generally Q39 Ranges from 1 (not satisﬁed) to 10 (satisﬁed) with your life as a whole these days.
Conservative Q22 =1 for workers that said they were a 9 or 10 on a 10 point scale where 1=liberal and 10=conservative.
Liberal Q22 =1 for workers that said they were a 1 or 2 on a 10 point scale where 1=liberal and 10=conservative.
Flipping Time NA Time to answer the coin ﬂipping question.
Duration NA Total time to complete the survey, less ﬂipping time.
2 + 3 Correct Q60 Answer to the question, What is the number two plus the number three equal to?
Note: See the online Appendix for a copy of the survey that was administered. Survey question
numbers listed in the second column correspond to the oath treatment. Other includes Hawaiian and
Paciﬁc Islander, and non White, Hispanic, Black, and Asian.
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Figure 1: Flipping Time: Distributions by Oath
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Note: 35 workers that spent more than 200 seconds on the coin-ﬂipping question were dropped
to construct these ﬁgures.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
No Oath Oath
Outcome Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
Heads Flipped 6.331 1 10 6.058 0 10
Male .627 0 1 .593 0 1
Age 35.04 18 82 35.12 18 84
White .630 0 1 .627 0 1
Black .056 0 1 .061 0 1
Hispanic 0 0 0 .047 0 1
Asian .055 0 1 .057 0 1
Other .256 0 1 .207 0 1
USA .820 0 1 .825 0 1
Justiﬁed Beneﬁts 2.023 0 10 2.02 0 10
Justiﬁed Transport 2.420 0 10 2.505 0 10
Justiﬁed Steal 1.394 0 10 1.350 0 10
Justiﬁed Taxes 1.943 0 10 1.998 0 10
Justiﬁed Bribe 1.643 0 10 1.625 0 10
Trust People .505 0 1 .484 0 1
SNAP Cheat .290 0 1 .289 0 1
Heads Guessed 6.44 1 10 6.35 0 10
God .582 0 1 .574 0 1
Hell .398 0 1 .402 0 1
No Church .550 0 1 .552 0 1
Low Church .099 0 1 .098 0 1
Med Church .109 0 1 .117 0 1
High Church .035 0 1 .036 0 1
No Religion .490 0 1 .496 0 1
Hindu .124 0 1 .117 0 1
Muslim .016 0 1 .014 0 1
Jew .011 0 1 .019 0 1
Catholic .127 0 1 .126 0 1
Protestant .162 0 1 .165 0 1
High Income .207 0 1 .234 0 1
Low Income .405 0 1 .417 0 1
Satisﬁed Financial 6.501 1 10 6.393 1 10
Satisﬁed Generally 5.357 1 10 5.177 1 10
Conservative .091 0 1 .096 0 1
Liberal .211 0 1 .245 0 1
Flipping Time 56.87 2.25 971 57.9 2.179 987.057
Duration 214 53.7 2722 243 49 2057
2 + 3 Correct 97.44 0 1 96.46 0 1
N 685 681
Note: See Table 1 for variable deﬁnitions.
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Table 3: Eﬀect of the Oath
Variable Avg Heads Flipped 10(%) Quick Flipping Time Duration
All Workers
Oath 6.06 .129 .400 57.90 243.14
No Oath 6.33 .178 .426 56.87 214.23
p-value .008 .006 .170 .389 .002
N 1,366 1,366 1,366 1,366 1366
Shirkers
Oath 6.49 .241 - 14.14 221
No Oath 6.79 .291 - 13.62 203
p-value .072 .093 - .196 .138
N 565 565 - 565 565
Workers
Oath 5.76 .053 - 87.17 257
No Oath 5.98 .094 - 89.00 222
p-value .041 .014 - .637 .003
N 801 801 - 801 801
Note: p-value corresponds to a one-tailed t-test of equality between oath and no oath values. Shirkers
reported the number of heads ﬂipped in less than 30 seconds. The Workers reported this information
in more than 30 seconds.
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Table 4: Oath Eﬀects: Interactions
Variable Heads Flipped Flipped 10(%) Quick Flipping Time Duration
Oath -.674 -.638† -.272 5.76 10.37
(.475) (.392) (.290) (14.54) (39.85)
Age -.028*** -.024*** -.018*** .690*** -.352
(.007) (.007) (.004) (.210) (.515)
Male .362** .254** .171* -4.88 -15.51
(.166) (.123) (.101) (5.25) (14.80)
White .041 -.226* -.094 -1.23 -68.44***
(.214) (.134) (.116) (7.29) (18.38)
Black .089 -.109 -.243 2.19 -50.86*
(.413) (.253) (.224) (9.77) (26.27)
Asian .221 -.206 .038 .415 -73.83***
(.390) (.259) (.225) (13.22) (22.78)
Hispanic .349 -.057 -.154 3.23 -34.94
(.389) (.348) (.253) (8.67) (45.74)
Age×Oath .003 .007 .006 -.14.15 .483
(.011) (.010) (.007) (.298) (.719)
Male×Oath -.093 -.089 -.011 -7.28 5.99
(.230) (.178) (.143) (7.87) (21.40)
White × Oath .543* .376* .018 4.16 -7.64
(.304) (.213) (.170) (9.27) (26.27)
Black×Oath -.177 .143 -.092 15.27 13.06
(.562) (.384) (.321) (17.42) (41.54)
Asian×Oath -.115 .081 -.303 10.61 56.72
(.538) (.399) (.321) (16.50) (43.03)
Constant 7.043*** -.123 .427** 36.37*** 286.47***
(.323) (.260) (.202) (10.12) (29.38)
N 1,366 1,366 1,366 1,366 1,366
R2(Pseudo R2) .035 .039 .020 .018 .033
Total eﬀect of the oath by group:
Oath + Male×Oath -.768* -.727** -.284 -1.519 16.371
(.438) (.361) (.267) (12.508) (34.12)
Oath + White×Oath -.130 -.261 -.254 9.921 2.735
(.476) (.420) (.291) (14.326) (38.351)
Oath + Black×Oath -.852 -.495 -.364 21.036 23.437
(.628) (.497) (.374) (18.159) (41.458)
Oath + Asian×Oath -.790 -.556 -.576 16.380 67.099
(.607) (.509) (.378) (18.566) (46.519)
Note: The ﬁrst columns under the heading Heads Flipped gives the results from an OLS regression
of the number of heads ﬂipped with robust standard errors. The second column under the heading
Flipped 10 corresponds to a probit regression of the likelihood of reporting ten heads ﬂipped. †, *, **,
*** correspond to the 10.4%, 10%, 5%, and 1% conﬁdence levels, respectively. The bottom rows give
the total eﬀect of the oath by group. Standard errors are computed using Stata's lincom command.
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Table 5: Who Lies: Endogenous Covariates
Direct Interacted
Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient
Independent Variable: (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Self Reported Honesty
Justiﬁed Beneﬁts .160*** -.033
(.036) (.050)
Justiﬁed Transport .128*** -.005
(.033) (.047)
Justiﬁed Steal .074* .038
(.044) (.063)
Justiﬁed Taxes .093*** .059
(.035) (.049)
Justiﬁed Bribe .109*** .035
(.040) (.057)
Trust in Others
Trust People -.419*** .378*
(.162) (.227)
SNAP Cheat .465** -.361
(.216) (.269)
Heads Guessed .435*** -.012
(.045) (.069)
Religiosity
God -.154 .081
(.169) (.229)
Hell .113 -.130
(.169) (.233)
No Church .032 .069
(.169) (.230)
Low Church -.659*** .760**
(.248) (.367)
Med Church -.138 .002
(.283) (.391)
High Church -.067 .159
(.475) (.626)
No Religion -.152 .252
(.167) (.226)
Hindu .375 -.471
(.338) (.405)
Muslim -.245 .388
(.786) (1.016)
Jew .405 .038
(.801) (1.072)
Catholic .412* -.268
(.245) (.337)
Protestant -.097 -.024
(.210) (.289)
Income
Rich .148 .068
(.189) (.262)
Poor .134 -.459**
(.167) (.230)
Satisﬁed Financial .077** -.035
(.035) (.050)
Satisﬁed Generally .037 .007
(.034) (.047)
Politics
Conservative -.269 -.023
(.303) (.425)
Liberal .421** -.412
(.196) (.264)
Note: Note that each entry in this table corresponds to a separate regression. Each estimate is
conditioned on worker race, gender, age, and the oath indicator. For each regression, N=1,366. The
ﬁrst column gives the coeﬃcient on each variable. The second column gives the coeﬃcient on each
variable interacted with the oath indicator variable. For each regression the outcome variable is the
number of heads ﬂipped.
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Table 6: Ex-Post Oath
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Heads -.276*** -.280*** -.149** -.165**
(.038) (.040) (.071) (.068)
Flipped 10 -1.28*** -1.316*** -.688** -.489
(.147) (.157) (.324) (.315)
Flipping Time -.0001
(.0009)
Quick -.643***
(.176)
Age -.001 -.002 -.002 -.006
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.006)
Male .035 .045 .048 .074
(.155) (.152) (.154) (.157)
White -.080 -.110 -.100 -.078
(.182) (.183) (.186) (.188)
Black -.059 -.030 -.053 -.067
(.362) (.337) (.351) (.361)
Asian -.345 -.422 -.391 -.388
(.316) (.315) (.319) (.326)
Constant 3.243*** 3.384 1.664*** 1.822*** 2.699*** 3.21***
(.303) (.492) (.090) (.327) (.540) (.538)
N 685 685 685 685 685 685
Pseudo R2 .172 .175 .170 .175 .187 .223
Note: This table gives results from probit regressions of the likelihood that a worker in the no-oath
treatment agreed to the ex-post oath asking if they swear upon their honor that they answered the coin
ﬂipping question honesty. For this analysis, the data is limited to workers not assigned to the ex-ante
oath treatment.
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Figure 2: Heads Flipped by Flipping Time & Oath
Pooled Shirkers (Quick) Workers (Slow)
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Note: Recall that workers spent at least thirty seconds answering the coin-ﬂipping task and
shirkers did not. According to Shapiro-Wilk tests, we reject the null hypothesis that each
of the distributions are similar to the normal distribution. For the pooled data, according
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, we reject the null hypothesis that the Oath and No Oath distri-
butions are similar (p-value =0.10). For shirkers and workers we individually cannot reject
the null hypothesis that the Oath distributions are similar to the No Oath distributions.
32
Figure 3: Survey Duration: Distributions by Oath
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Note: 13 workers that spent more than 1000 seconds completing the survey (net of ﬂipping
time) were dropped to construct these ﬁgures.
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6.2 Survey Instrument
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Oath Treatment.  
 
Q7 Welcome and thank you for participating.       
STUDY:  By proceeding, you have volunteered to participate in a study conducted by the 
University of Alaska Anchorage Department of Economics. The UAA Principal Investigators are 
Alexander James and James Murphy. 
  
   VOLUNTARY NATURE OF PARTICIPATION: Your participation in this study is 
voluntary.  You may stop at any time and you do not have to answer any questions you don’t 
want to.  Nothing will happen to you if you choose not to answer any questions or if you decide 
not to participate.   
 PAYMENT: You will be paid $1.00 for completing the survey and will have an opportunity to 
earn additional money during the survey. At the end of the survey you will be given a code to 
enter into Mechanical Turk to receive this payment.      TIME: This survey should take no more 
than 3 minutes to complete. 
  
 RISKS: There are no foreseeable risks or discomforts. 
  
 BENEFITS: There are no direct personal benefits for participation other than the cash payment 
you receive. 
  
 PARTICIPATION: You must be 18 or over to participate. Your participation is voluntary, and 
you may withdraw from the study at any time and for any reason. There are no costs to you or 
any other party. 
  
 CONFIDENTIALITY: All of the information we obtain from you will be kept confidential.  
  
 CONTACT: If you have any questions about the research you can reach Alexander James at 
ajames27@alaska.edu or James Murphy at jjmurphy2@alaska.edu. If you have any questions 
about your rights as a research participant, please contact the UAA Research Compliance office 
at 907-786-1099.   
 CONSENT: If you agree to participate in this survey, please click the next button. Otherwise, 
please close your browser window.    
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Q61 Timing 
First Click  (1) 
Last Click  (2) 
Page Submit  (3) 
Click Count  (4) 
 
 
 
Q4  
Solemn Oath   
Before we begin, do you swear upon your honor to answer the following questions truthfully? 
(You will be allowed to continue with this survey regardless of your answer to this question). 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
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Q58 Timing 
First Click  (1) 
Last Click  (2) 
Page Submit  (3) 
Click Count  (4) 
 
 
 
Q3 Flip a coin 10 times. You will be paid a bonus of 10 cents per head that is flipped. How many 
heads did you flip? 
▼ 0 heads (1) ... 10 heads (19) 
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Q8 What is your gender? 
o Male  (1)  
o Female  (2)  
 
 
 
Q19 What is your age in years? 
 0 20 40 60 80 100 
 
Years Old () 
 
 
 
 
 
Q60 What is your marital status? 
o Married  (1)  
o Living together as married  (2)  
o Divorced  (3)  
o Separated  (4)  
o Widowed  (5)  
o Single  (6)  
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Q62 How many children do you have? 
▢  No children  (1)  
▢  One child  (2)  
▢  Two children  (3)  
▢  Three children  (4)  
▢  Four children  (5)  
▢  Five children  (6)  
▢  Six children  (7)  
▢  Seven children  (8)  
▢  Eight or more children  (9)  
 
 
 
Q39 All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Using the 
slider bar below on which 1 means you are "completely dissatisfied'' and 10 means you are 
"completely satisfied" where would you put your satisfaction with your life as a whole? 
 Completely Dissatisfied Completely Satisfied 
 
 1 3 5 6 8 10 
 
1 () 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q21 What is your approximate household income? 
▼ Less than $10,000 (1) ... More than $200,000 (14) 
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Q47 What is your approximate household wealth? 
▼ Less than $10,000 (1) ... More than $200,000 (14) 
 
 
 
Q43 How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household? Please use this scale 
to help with your answer where 1 indicates you are "completely dissatisfied" and 10 indicates 
you are "completely satisfied". 
 Completely Dissatisfied Completely Satisfied 
 
 1 3 5 6 8 10 
 
1 () 
 
 
 
 
 
Q22 In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right". How would you place your views 
on this scale, generally speaking? 
 Left Right 
 
 1 3 5 6 8 10 
 
1 () 
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Q23 What is your highest level of education? 
o Not a high school graduate  (1)  
o High school graduate  (2)  
o Some college  (3)  
o Associate degree  (4)  
o Bachelors degree  (5)  
o Advanced degree  (6)  
 
 
  
 
Q25 In which country are you a citizen? 
▼ Afghanistan (1) ... Zimbabwe (1357) 
 
 
Display This Question: 
If List of Countries = United States of America 
 
Q53 In which state do you currently reside? 
▼ Alabama (1) ... I do not reside in the United States (53) 
 
 
Display This Question: 
If List of Countries = United States of America 
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Q28 Are you: 
▢  Non-Hispanic White  (1)  
▢  Black or African American  (3)  
▢  American Indian and Alaska Native  (4)  
▢  Asian  (5)  
▢  Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander  (6)  
▢  Hispanic  (7)  
▢  Other  (8)  
 
 
 
Q60 We want to make sure you are not a robot. What is the number two plus the number three 
equal to? 
o 1  (1)  
o 2  (2)  
o 3  (3)  
o 4  (4)  
o 5  (5)  
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Q26 Do you belong to a religion or religious denomination? If yes, which one? 
▢  Do not belong to a denomination  (1)  
▢  Roman Catholic  (2)  
▢  Protestant  (3)  
▢  Orthodox (Russian/Greek/etc.)  (4)  
▢  Jew  (5)  
▢  Muslim  (6)  
▢  Hindu  (7)  
▢  Buddhist  (8)  
▢  Other  (9) ________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Q49 Apart from weddings an funerals, about how often do you attend religious services these 
days? 
o More than once a week  (1)  
o Once a week  (2)  
o Once a month  (3)  
o Only on special holidays  (4)  
o Once a year  (5)  
o Less often  (6)  
o Never, practically never  (7)  
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Q50 Apart from weddings and funerals, about how often do you pray? 
o Several times a day  (1)  
o Once a day  (2)  
o Several times each week  (3)  
o Only when attending religious services  (4)  
o Only on special holidays  (5)  
o Once a year  (6)  
o Less often  (7)  
o Never, practically never  (8)  
 
 
 
Q51 Do you believe in God? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
 
 
Q52 Do you believe in hell? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
 
 
Q57 Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, 
never be justified, or something in between, using this scale. 
 Never Justifiable Always Justifiable 
 
 0 2 4 6 8 10 
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Claiming government benefits to which you 
are not entitled ()  
Avoiding a fare on public transport () 
 
Stealing property () 
 
Cheating on taxes if you have a chance () 
 
Someone accepting a bribe in the course of 
their duties ()  
 
 
 
Display This Question: 
If List of Countries = United States of America 
 
Q29 What percent of food stamp recipients do you think are acting fraudulently, or otherwise 
"cheating the U.S. welfare system"? 
 0 20 40 60 80 100 
 
% of Welfare Cheaters () 
 
 
 
 
 
Q41 Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be 
very careful in dealing with people? 
o Most people can be trusted  (1)  
o Need to be very careful  (2)  
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Q68 Timing 
First Click  (1) 
Last Click  (2) 
Page Submit  (3) 
Click Count  (4) 
 
 
 
 
Q30 Averaged  across all of the responses we received from this MTurk survey, if people were 
being completely honest, the average number of heads reported flipped should be 5. What do 
you think will be the average number of heads reported flipped? 
▼ 0 heads (1) ... 10 heads (11) 
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Q31 Did swearing upon your honor to tell the truth affect the number of heads you reported 
flipping? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
o I did not swear upon my honor to answer the questions truthfully  (3)  
 
End of Block: Default Question Block 
 
Start of Block: Block 1 
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No Oath Treatment.  
 
Q8 Welcome and thank you for participating.      STUDY:  By proceeding, you have volunteered 
to participate in a study conducted by the University of Alaska Anchorage Department of 
Economics. The UAA Principal Investigators are Alexander James and James Murphy. 
  
   VOLUNTARY NATURE OF PARTICIPATION: Your participation in this study is 
voluntary.  You may stop at any time and you do not have to answer any questions you don’t 
want to.  Nothing will happen to you if you choose not to answer any questions or if you decide 
not to participate.   
 PAYMENT: You will be paid $1.00 for completing the survey and will have an opportunity to 
earn additional money during the survey. At the end of the survey you will be given a code to 
enter into Mechanical Turk to receive this payment.      TIME: This survey should take no more 
than 3 minutes to complete. 
  
 RISKS: There are no foreseeable risks or discomforts. 
  
 BENEFITS: There are no direct personal benefits for participation other than the cash payment 
you receive. 
  
 PARTICIPATION: You must be 18 or over to participate. Your participation is voluntary, and 
you may withdraw from the study at any time and for any reason. There are no costs to you or 
any other party. 
  
 CONFIDENTIALITY: All of the information we obtain from you will be kept confidential.  
  
 CONTACT: If you have any questions about the research you can reach Alexander James at 
ajames27@alaska.edu or James Murphy at jjmurphy2@alaska.edu. If you have any questions 
about your rights as a research participant, please contact the UAA Research Compliance office 
at 907-786-1099.   
 CONSENT: If you agree to participate in this survey, please click the next button. Otherwise, 
please close your browser window.    
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Q60 Timing 
First Click  (1) 
Last Click  (2) 
Page Submit  (3) 
Click Count  (4) 
 
 
 
 
Q6 Flip a coin 10 times. You will be paid a bonus of 10 cents per head that is flipped. How many 
heads did you flip? 
▼ 0 heads (1) ... 10 heads (11) 
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Q62 Timing 
First Click  (1) 
Last Click  (2) 
Page Submit  (3) 
Click Count  (4) 
 
 
 
Q32 Do you swear upon your honor that the number of heads you reported flipping is truthful? 
(You will be paid according to the number of heads you reported flipping regardless of your 
answer to this question). 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
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Q7 What is your gender? 
o Male  (1)  
o Female  (2)  
 
 
 
Q33 What is your age in years? 
 0 20 40 60 80 100 
 
Years Old () 
 
 
 
 
 
Q61 What is your marital status? 
o Married  (1)  
o Living together as married  (2)  
o Divorced  (3)  
o Separated  (4)  
o Widowed  (5)  
o Single  (6)  
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Q63 How many children do you have? 
▢  No Children  (1)  
▢  One child  (2)  
▢  Two children  (3)  
▢  Three children  (4)  
▢  Four children  (5)  
▢  Five children  (6)  
▢  Six children  (7)  
▢  Seven children  (8)  
▢  Eight or more children  (9)  
 
 
 
Q40 All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Using the 
slider bar below on which 1 means you are "completely dissatisfied'' and 10 means you are 
"completely satisfied" where would you put your satisfaction with your life as a whole? 
 Completely Dissatisfied Completely Satisfied 
 
 1 3 5 6 8 10 
 
  () 
 
 
 
 
 
Q49 What is your approximate household income? 
▼ Less than $10,000 (1) ... More than $200,000 (14) 
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Q50 What is your approximate household wealth? 
▼ Less than $10,000 (1) ... More than $200,000 (14) 
 
 
 
Q45 How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household? Please use this scale 
to help with your answer where 1 indicates you are "completely dissatisfied" and 10 indicates 
you are "completely satisfied". 
 Completely Dissatisfied Completely Satisfied 
 
 1 3 6 8 10 
 
1 () 
 
 
 
 
 
Q37 In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right". How would you place your views 
on this scale, generally speaking? 
 Left Right 
 
 1 3 5 6 8 10 
 
2 () 
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Q36 What is your highest level of education? 
o Not a high school graduate  (1)  
o High school graduate  (2)  
o Some college  (3)  
o Associate degree  (4)  
o Bachelors degree  (5)  
o Advanced degree  (6)  
 
 
  
 
Q39 In which country are you a citizen? 
▼ Afghanistan (1) ... Zimbabwe (1357) 
 
 
Display This Question: 
If List of Countries = United States of America 
 
 
Q59 In which state do you currently reside? 
▼ Alabama (1) ... I do not reside in the United States (53) 
 
 
Display This Question: 
If List of Countries = United States of America 
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Q44 Are you: 
▢  Non-Hispanic White  (1)  
▢  Black or African American  (2)  
▢  American Indian and Alaska Native  (3)  
▢  Asian  (4)  
▢  Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander  (5)  
▢  Hispanic or Latino  (6)  
▢  Other  (7)  
 
 
 
Q61 We want to make sure you are not a robot. What is the number two plus the number three 
equal to? 
o 1  (1)  
o 2  (2)  
o 3  (3)  
o 4  (4)  
o 5  (5)  
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Q46 Do you belong to a religion or religious denomination? If yes, which one? 
▢  Do not belong to a denomination  (1)  
▢  Roman Catholic  (2)  
▢  Protestant  (3)  
▢  Orthodox (Russian/Greek/etc.)  (4)  
▢  Jew  (5)  
▢  Muslim  (6)  
▢  Hindu  (7)  
▢  Buddhist  (8)  
▢  Other  (9) ________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Q47 Apart from weddings an funerals, about how often do you attend religious services these 
days? 
o More than once a week  (1)  
o Once a week  (2)  
o Once a month  (3)  
o Only on special holidays  (4)  
o Once a year  (5)  
o Less often  (6)  
o Never, practically never  (7)  
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Q48 Apart from weddings and funerals, about how often do you pray? 
o Several times a day  (1)  
o Once a day  (2)  
o Several times each week  (3)  
o Only when attending religious services  (4)  
o Only on special holidays  (5)  
o Once a year  (6)  
o Less often  (7)  
o Never, practically never  (8)  
 
 
 
Q53 Do you believe in God? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
 
 
Q54 Do you believe in hell? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
 
 
Q56 Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, 
never be justified, or something in between, using this scale. 
 Never Justifiable Always Justifiable 
 
 0 2 4 6 8 10 
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Claiming government benefits to which you 
are not entitled ()  
Avoiding a fare on public transport () 
 
Stealing property () 
 
Cheating on taxes if you have a chance () 
 
Someone accepting a bribe in the course of 
their duties ()  
 
 
 
Display This Question: 
If List of Countries = United States of America 
 
Q40 What percent of food stamp recipients do you think are acting fraudulently, or otherwise 
"cheating the U.S. welfare system"? 
 0 20 40 60 80 100 
 
% of Welfare Cheaters () 
 
 
 
 
 
Q42 Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be 
very careful in dealing with people? 
o Most people can be trusted  (1)  
o Need to be very careful  (2)  
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Q69 Timing 
First Click  (1) 
Last Click  (2) 
Page Submit  (3) 
Click Count  (4) 
 
 
 
 
Q41 Averaged  across all of the responses we received from this MTurk survey, if people were 
being completely honest, the average number of heads reported flipped should be 5. What do 
you think will be the average number of heads reported flipped? 
▼ 0 heads (1) ... 10 heads (11) 
 
 
